We investigate the impact of actors' positions within regional innovator networks on their innovative performance. The networks of four selected regions are based on information on patent applicants and inventors. Count data regressions show positive effects on innovation of both the total number of relations and of access to a larger knowledge base. However, when looking at innovators that are characterised by multiple internal and external contacts, our results suggest that these gatekeepers are not able to reap all the benefits associated with their brokering position. This implies that gatekeepers exert external effects on the innovation system.
Introduction
Innovation processes by firms or other innovative actors cannot be analysed in isolation. It is a common understanding that actors generate novelty mostly through the combination of existing knowledge, which might either be acquired via own learning processes in the past or through interaction with other actors. This interactive feature of innovation is at the core of the systemic view of innovation, which is manifested in the seminal volumes on national innovation systems by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) . This theory has rapidly developed and broadened its coverage from the analysis of national innovation systems to regional (Braczyk et al., 1998) , sectoral (Malerba, 2002) or technological systems (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991) .
The rising interest in the spatial distribution of economic activities by economists and an equally sharp rise in interest of geographers to incorporate economic theories into their research, led to a major increase in publications on regional innovation systems, clusters, industrial districts, etc. In studying the internal mechanisms of knowledge exchange it soon became clear that for sustainable regional development interaction within the system cannot be sufficient but has to be accompanied by interaction with external actors (Storper and Venables, 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004) . However, within a regional innovation system only a few actors have the capabilities and/or incentives for widespread interaction with local and external actors. These actors serve as technological gatekeepers for the innovation system (Allen, 1977; Giuliani, 2005; Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Munari et al., 2005) . Depending on the perspective of the analysis, gatekeepers can be found on various levels. Within organisations, gatekeepers link different divisions. In establishing linkages between organisations, they might be found in either of the connected organisations. In our setting, organisations themselves can be gatekeepers if they interact with actors inside the regional innovation system but also hold contacts with external actors.
On the regional level it is quite clear that these external contacts are vital for the innovative performance if they reach into the local system. The variety and intensity of personal relationships in a vibrant local network is captured by the notion of local "buzz" (Storper and Venables, 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004) . A high degree of innovative buzz should increase the region-specific knowledge-stock and-if it is best practice-lead to a comparative advantage with respect to other localities. It has to be pointed out though, that there is also the possibility of "too much proximity" (Boschma, 2005) . In contrast to a view that only focusses on the benefits of knowledge spillovers within local networks, only recently several authors have emphasised the importance of interaction with actors external to the local system (Gertler, 1997; Bathelt et al., 2004; Bathelt, 2005) . The benefits of a dense local network then have to be seen in light of a fast diffusion of external knowledge within the system and the risk of a technological lock-in (Grabher, 1993) , i.e. losing connections to new developments, diminishes. Obviously, highly specialised regions face a higher risk of such a technological lock-in. Accordingly, Bathelt et al. (2004) argue that successful clusters are characterised by actors that are aware of these problems and generate novelty by drawing on specific local knowledge, combining it with external knowledge components. This argument is supported by Broekel and Meder (2008) who show the importance of both types of relations (internal and external) for the electronics industry in Germany. All this points towards the important role of gatekeepers for a (regional) innovation system as a whole.
From an individual perspective, the benefits are not so clear. Given that, generally, linkages in the research process are important (e.g. Ahuja, 2000) , we can still ask why firms should share their externally acquired knowledge with actors at their own location. Based on previous research, we know that gatekeepers are characterised by high absorptive capacity (Giuliani, 2005; Graf, 2010) and that they are often research organisations that belong to the public sector (Steiner and Ploder, 2008; Graf, 2010) . These results hint towards gatekeepers as providers of a (local) public or club good (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001) . This is the starting point for our study. Our main research question is whether actors benefit from interacting with internal and external actors of the respective innovation system, i.e. by acting as a gatekeeper.
To answer this question (and related questions) we employ methods of social network analysis based on German patent applications between 1995 and 2001 to generate network measures on an individual level. The analysis is applied to the innovator networks of four regions in Germany: Aachen and Karlsruhe in the western part, and Jena and Dresden in the eastern part. We assume linkages, and therefore knowledge transfer, between two innovators (patent applicants) if they jointly apply for a patent ("cooperation") or if one inventor is observed as having worked for both innovators on distinct patents ("scientist mobility") (Cantner and Graf, 2006; Graf and Henning, 2009) . Innovators are qualified as external actors if they have applied for at least one patent with an inventor living in the region but are not located in the region themselves. Based on these networks, we characterise actors according to their role and/or position within the network and test their influence on the innovative performance in terms of applied patents in subsequent periods.
Our analysis unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we review the body of existing theoretical work on the relevance of the network position on innovative success. This is followed by a brief description of the regions, the method of social network analysis and the treatment of the data in Section 3. Section 4 then proceeds with an outline of the count data regression methods we apply and in Section 5 we present and discuss the regression results. Section 6 concludes.
Network Position and Innovation

Linkages in Innovation
Cooperation and mobility. Since the sources of innovation are often found between firms, universities, research laboratories, suppliers and customers (Powell, 1990) , firms commit resources to grasp these sources of innovation. Subsequent to Penrose's (1959) work on a resource-based view of the firm, the development of organisational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Shane, 1996) and access to capital (Martin and Justis, 1993) have been shown to exert positive growth effects. To overcome resource scarcities and to benefit from partners' resources, firms engage in interfirm cooperation (Combs and Ketchen, 1999) . Since cooperation opens up possibilities to perform activities which a single firm could not perform on its own, resource sharing is considered a primary explanation for interfirm cooperation (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Hamel, 1991) . Besides this cost-economising argument, i.e. sharing the costs of research activities, risk sharing, obtaining access to new markets and technologies, and pooling of complementary skills are more strategic rationales for collaboration in research and development (Kogut, 1989; Hagedoorn, 1993; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Mowery et al., 1998) .
Another important channel for the transfer of knowledge is labor mobility. As a major example, a higher level of mobility is held responsible for the success of Silicon Valley in comparison to other regions as knowledge is transmitted faster and more efficiently through scientists and engineers who frequently change their jobs (Saxenian, 1994; Almeida and Kogut, 1999) . In a more comprehensive analysis Lissoni (2006, 2009) find the mobility of inventors to be the main source of localised knowledge spillovers.
Relevance of network position on innovative success. The network perspective not only accounts for the frequency and intensity of bilateral relations in the sense of relational embeddedness (Granovetter, 1973 ), but also makes it possible to analyse the structure of such a network and of individual positions therein captured by the notion of structural embeddedness (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1998) . If we allow for the possibility that knowledge can flow not just between two actors, but through several nodes of a network, the position in the network becomes of major importance for the acquisition of external knowledge. Ahuja (2000) shows the relevance of indirect linkages in addition to direct forms of interaction. While Ahuja (2000) finds a significant impact of direct ties (degree) on subsequent innovation output, Powell et al. (1996) obtain rather ambiguous results concerning the influence of a central position in the network on firm growth. In their study, degree centrality predicts employment growth, although no significant effects were found for closeness centrality or membership in the main component. In a subsequent study on an expanded dataset ranging from 1988 to 1997, Powell et al. (1999) conclude that centrality stimulates growth in size and internally-funded research and development (R&D) and reinforces the use of R&D alliances.
However, Baum et al. (2000) show that the influence of alliances on patenting intensity depends on the partner type, and others argue that the environmental context also shapes the structure of relations and their influence on performance. Rowley et al. (2000) study two networks constituted by horizontal alliances in the US semiconductor and steel industries and test the differential influence of strong ties, weak ties and the density of the neighborhood on return on assets. They find an overall negative influence of strong ties on performance, but in the exploitation environment of the steel industry, they find a positive influence. Weak ties are positive overall, but especially so in the exploration context of the semiconductor industry. In his valuable overview of studies relating interfirm networks and innovation, Ozman (2009) concludes that the difficulty of obtaining robust results in some areas is due to the fact that empirical network studies are investigating different sectors in different environmental contexts and define networks in different ways. Especially in the context of regional networks, the influence of centrality on innovation calls for further inquiry and motivates our first two research questions.
Research Question 1: What is the influence of a central network position of an actor on its innovation output in the subsequent period?
Research Question 2: To which extent is this influence dependent on the centrality concept applied?
Gatekeepers and Innovation
To exploit the advantages of proximity while at the same time avoiding the problems of lockin, innovation systems need an interface between local and global knowledge systems (Kim and von Tunzelmann, 1998) . Allen (1977) originally introduced the term "technological gatekeeper" to describe R&D professionals with the intellectual and personal ability to absorb external knowledge and translate it to their internal co-workers (Morrison, 2008) . In the context of a regional innovation system, gatekeepers link the system to outside knowledge sources (Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Graf, 2010) . In general, this role is assumed to be fulfilled by the large and technologically advanced firms within the local innovation system which have the capacity to scan and exploit external sources and the power to push the new knowledge into the local system (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Giuliani and Bell, 2005) . Universities and public research institutes are primary candidates for such a position as they not only have the absorptive capacity to absorb external knowledge but also have incentives to spread knowledge as a part of their public mission (Graf, 2010) . Knowledge might also be channeled through multinational firms originating from outside the regional system, seeking to exploit special local resources .
While the literature reviewed above provides arguments and some evidence for the necessity of internal and external relations on the level of the region, it is not quite clear what motivates actors to act as a gatekeeper if they would not benefit themselves from being in such a position. According to Burt (1992) structural holes provide the opportunity to grasp brokerage advantages from the ability to arbitrage non-redundant information exchanges. As noted above, actors qualify as gatekeepers if they serve two functions for the regional innovation system: external knowledge sourcing and diffusion within the local system-thereby acting as brokers of knowledge (Giuliani, 2005; Wink, 2008) . In terms of network relations this means that a gatekeeper has to interact frequently with partners external to the system and at the same time is integrated within the local system via a sufficient number of internal relations (Giuliani and Bell, 2005) . They argue that "a cluster does not absorb external knowledge uniformly through all its constituent firms, but selectively through only those firms with a low cognitive distance from the technological frontier. Interestingly enough, firms with high external openness could be potentially fruitful at local level if they contribute to the diffusion of acquired knowledge to other firms in the cluster, and perform as technological gatekeepers" (Giuliani and Bell, 2005) . Recent studies on the functions of gatekeepers show that the effective realisation of "potential absorptive capacity" requires additional effort regarding the transfer of knowledge into the cluster (Lazaric et al., 2008) and that gatekeepers have to put efforts into transcoding and filtering of external knowledge (Morrison, 2008) . To summarise, if actors with (non-redundant) external contacts benefit from their nonlocal resources, they should show a higher level of innovation output. A high level of internal contacts, however, leads to a diffusion of this externally acquired knowledge. The benefits from non-local knowledge elements are therefore non-exclusive and this second effect of being a gatekeeper should work in the opposite direction. As such, we cannot state a clear hypothesis regarding the effect of being a gatekeeper on innovation output. On a low level of technological sophistication, it might well be better to only have internal contacts, while for actors at the technological frontier it should be necessary to have both, internal and external relations.
This brings us to our main research questions.
Research Question 3: Are gatekeepers able to reap benefits in terms of innovative success from their position within the network?
Research Question 4: Are there differences in the influence of the intensity of gatekeeping activity on innovative success?
Method and Data
Social Network Analysis and Patent Data
With respect to our methodological approach we follow a literature that tries to gain deeper insights into the innovation process by applying social network analysis to study interaction structures in the process of innovation. This literature has made substantial advances in the development of theoretical models (e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Cowan et al., 2006; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007; Carayol et al., 2008) , and also in the empirical investigation of innovation networks over the last years (e.g. Powell et al., 1996; Cantner and Graf, 2006; Fleming and Frenken, 2007; . Social network analysis focuses on relations, i.e. insights are mainly expected from the investigation of the interplay and communication between actors and only to a lesser extent from looking at the isolated actors' characteristics. Consequently, social network analysis is the appropriate methodology for identifying and studying gatekeepers as they are defined by their special ability to build and maintain relations between internal and external actors.
To make use of the methodology of social network analysis, we require relational data. Patent data meet this requirement: they provide information about the persons involved in the underlying innovative activity and can therefore be used to uncover relations between these persons. As patents are created through a formally prescribed procedure the resulting databases are publicly accessible, consistent and complete in the sense that any innovative effort that was judged to be worth a patent application is included. Of course, there are other mechanisms for appropriating the returns from innovative activities with secrecy being one of the most important ones (Cohen et al., 2000) . The propensity to patent also varies substantially between sectors. Patenting is more important in manufacturing than in services (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2003) and estimates by Arundel and Kabla (1998) suggest that in most industries less than 50% of the innovations are patented. With these peculiarities of our data in mind, we investigate networks of innovators based on German patent applications at the German Patent Office which were disclosed from 1995 to 2001.
Methodically, one has the choice to relate patent applicants or patent inventors. The former, in most cases private firms or public research bodies, hold the property rights to economically exploit the invention, should it become a successful innovation. We call them (potential) innovators. The latter are the individuals who actually performed the research leading to the patent application. Knowledge is assumed to flow between individuals who know each other from joint research projects rather than between the innovators. Therefore, it is common to link the inventors of patents directly (Balconi et al., 2004; Singh, 2005) , but these connections can also be used to identify channels of knowledge transmission between the innovators in linking them via common inventors (Cantner and Graf, 2006; Graf and Henning, 2009; Breschi and Lissoni, 2009) . While the function of a gatekeeper could in principle be served by individuals as well as by organisations, we find it more appropriate to study organisations as they are less mobile than individuals and are therefore more easily identified as local or external actors.
The basic assumption within this methodology is that two innovators are related if at least one inventor has developed a patent for both innovators. In practical terms this means that a relation is established between A and B if we find an inventor on a patent by A and on a patent by B. There are two possibilities of how this might appear.
1. The innovators are joint assignees of the same patent. In this case we assume a previous research cooperation. 2. The same inventor is named on two distinct patents assigned by different innovators.
In this case we assume mobility of the inventor between the innovators.
We interpret the linkages (inventors) between the nodes (innovators) as possible channels of knowledge transmission . In the case of cooperations, we do not know to which of the innovators the members of the inventing team belong, but we do know that all of them know someone from all co-applicants. In the case of mobility, the interpretation is less trivial. First, it might be interpreted as a directed flow of knowledge (incorporated in the inventor who moves) from one innovator to the other. Second, mobility can also be interpreted as a (possible) channel of knowledge transmission as the linking inventors know collaborators from both innovators. Having discussed these commonalities and differences between the two cases, we combine them into a single innovator network.
For the subsequent analysis we use the dichotomised versions of these networks to account for the variety of external sources of knowledge irrespective of the intensity of relations.
To perform a regional analysis, we also have to discuss the geographical assignment of patent applications. If the goal is to sketch inventive activity within the region, the first best solution would be to use the address of the research laboratory where the R&D was performed. As patent statistics do not provide this information, the second best solution is to use the applicant's address assuming that the research lab of the firm or university holding the patent is located there. Unfortunately, we face the problem that several, especially large, organisations often have many and regionally dispersed subsidiaries, but apply for patents centrally, on behalf of the headquarters instead of the subsidiary where the research actually was conducted. The common solution to this difficulty is to refer to the inventors' residence instead of the innovator's, following the assumption that people normally live not far away from the place where they work (Jaffe et al., 1993; Breschi and Lissoni, 2006) . Consequently, we base the regional networks on all patent applications with at least one inventor residing in the respective region.
The last step is to separate internal and external innovators. Innovators are qualified as external actors if they have applied for at least one patent with an inventor living in the region (otherwise the patent would not have been included in the regional sample in the first step), but are themselves not located in the region. To correct for the misleading effects of headquarters patenting mentioned above, the list of these (presumed) external actors was then carefully checked to allocate them correctly, whenever they could be identified as a local (and therefore internal) subsidiary (see Appendix for further details of this procedure).
Data
Regions. We selected two eastern regions with the highest innovation performance, Dresden and Jena, and compared them to the most efficient regions of comparable size in the western part of Germany, Aachen and Karlsruhe. We did not select the most efficient regions, Munich and Stuttgart, 3 for this comparison because these two regions are substantially larger. The geographical boundaries of the regions are defined as German planning regions ("Raumordnungsregionen"). Designed to represent socio-economic entities, they normally comprise several NUTS3 level districts, namely a core city and its surrounding area. We consider planning regions to be more suitable than districts. In the first place, the core city districts seem to be too small because local innovation systems may well include some R&D capacities located beyond the boundaries of the core city. The second reason is methodological: since patents are assigned to regions in accordance with the inventors' residence, this larger regional unit allows us to account for commuting inventors who work in the city but live in the surrounding areas. All four regions are of comparable size, ranging from 800,000 inhabitants in Jena to 1.2 million inhabitants in Aachen. Each region contains a research university and a number of public research organisations such as institutes of the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, the Leibniz Association and the Max Planck Society. All regions have a considerable tradition in manufacturing industries. From the perspective of patenting activity the most important technologies are printing and instruments in Dresden, instruments and optics in Jena, electronics and instruments in Aachen and instruments and electronics in Karlsruhe. The fact that instruments are at a top position in all regions ensures that the four regions are not overly diverse with respect to their technological orientation.
4
Variables. For our econometric analysis in Section 5, we employ the following variables on the level of the individual innovator. We only include the internal actors since we know about both their internal and external relations while for external actors we only know about their relations to actors within the focal region. Thus, our units of observation are patent applicants located within the respective region. We end up with 974 innovators located in Aachen, 600 from Dresden, 390 from Jena and 879 from Karlsruhe. We measure innovative output as the number of patent applications. Our dependent variable is the sum of all patent applications in the current period (No. of Patents t ). The explanatory variables can be divided into three groups. First, to control for persistence in the innovation process, we include the lagged innovation output (No. of Patents t21 ). In addition we control for size by the number of inventors in the same period (No. of Inventors t ) which is measured by the number of distinct inventors appearing on the patents of one organisation. As such, the number of inventors not only serves as a proxy for size but can also be interpreted as an R&D input measure or as an indicator of the breadth of the knowledge base. The second group of variables consists of those characterising the actors according to their position in the regional network in period t 2 1. The networks are generated for three overlapping periods: 1995-1997 (P1), 1997-1999 (P2) and 1999-2001 (P3) . These periods are sufficiently long to allow for the observation of mobility between the innovators and at the same time short enough to allow for the detachment of relations. Degree t21 is the number of direct linkages irrespective of the location of the partner. Betweenness t21 is another measure of centrality that accounts for the position in the whole network (whereas degree is only based on the egonetwork). It is calculated as the frequency with which an actor is positioned between pairs of other actors on the shortest path connecting them. If knowledge can only "flow" through the connected part of a network, it should make a difference for an actor to be a member of the main component, meaning the largest connected part of the network. Therefore, we include the dummy variable MainComp t21 to account for a position within the largest component of the respective regional network. The last two network related variables are the ones that represent the actors' position as a gatekeeper. Our first index (Gatekeeper 1 t21 ) merely distinguishes between internal and external partners and is calculated as the product of both (Graf, 2010) . The second index is slightly more sophisticated. This brokerage measure is described by Gould and Fernandez (1989) as the role played by an actor who mediates contact between two other actors who belong to different groups. In our setting, gatekeepers are local actors that have non-redundant contacts to internal and external nodes in the regional network. Gatekeeper 2 t21 of an actor is then given as the number of brokering positions held by this actor.
5 Figure 1 compares the two gatekeeper indices showing that they are highly correlated and that the brokerage score (Gatekeeper 2) serves as an upper bound for the first index (Gatekeeper 1). Finally, in the third group we include dummies for actors located in the eastern part of Germany (i.e. Dresden and Jena), for individual applicants and for public research institutes. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 . The criterion for inclusion of observations is a patent in t 21, otherwise we cannot compute meaningful network variables for these actors.
Regression Model
The dependent variable in our regressions, the number of patents, is a count variable with the usual features of being discrete and being characterised by an excessive number of zeros. Therefore special regression methods are required for this data situation. The simplest count data regression method is based on the Poisson distribution. One main deficiency of the Poisson regression is the so-called equidispersion property of the Poisson distribution, meaning the equality of mean and variance. If the variance exceeds the mean we are faced with the overdispersion phenomenon. For that case a count data regression based on the negative binomial distribution has been developed. This NegBin regression is, however, difficult to estimate, which manifests in the frequent non-convergence of numerical optimisation procedures. Even when applying the NegBin regression the number of zeros in the data may be substantially larger than what is consistent with the negative binomial distribution. To deal with this case of zero-inflation other count data models have been developed. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a comprehensive account of count data regression analysis.
In recent years the research in the literature has developed towards regression models based on the generalised Poisson distribution as an alternative to the negative binomial distribution. The generalised Poisson distribution is constructed as a mixture of simple Poisson distributions, analogous to the derivation of the negative binomial distribution as a Famoye and Singh, 2006) . Since we suspect overdispersion as well as zero-inflation in our data we choose the more numerically stable zero-inflated variant of the generalised Poisson regression model (ZIGP) originally developed by Famoye and Singh (2003) in the form described in Czado et al. (2007) . Experiments with the NegBin regression in fact demonstrated the convergence problems for the case of our dataset. Let y i [ {0; 1; 2; . . . } denote the number of patents that an actor i applied for at the German Patent Office. Then the density function of the ZIGP model can be stated in its most general form as The computation of our estimates is performed using the function mle.zigp of the "ZIGP" package for R. We rely on the particular parametrisation of the model given in the documentation of Czado et al. (2007) accompanying the package. Thus we specify the influence of the explanatory variables on the mean by letting m depend on x i in the form mðx i Þ ¼ expðx 0 i bÞ. The overdispersion level is parameterised by f ¼ 1 þ expðaÞ, where a is the parameter that is actually computed. Note that with this parametrisation the overdispersion level is guaranteed to be larger than one, irrespective of the level of a. Finally, the zero-inflation level is parameterised by v ¼ expðgÞ=ð1 þ expðgÞÞ, where g is the parameter that is actually computed. Here the logistic transform bounds the zero-inflation level in the interval (0,1), irrespective of the value for g. In principle f and v could also be made dependent on explanatory variables which may or may not overlap with those in x i . In our estimates we treat them as constant and simply report the estimates for a and g as the levels of overdispersion and zero-inflation, respectively.
The asymptotic theory associated with the ZIGP model is not the standard one for generalised linear models since the ZIGP distribution does not belong to the exponential family of distributions. A brief discussion of consistency and asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimates appears in Czado et al. (2007) . The standard errors and the tstatistics reported in this paper rely on an estimate of the covariance matrix based on the Fisher information.
Construction of the R 2 measure. The R 2 measure we report in the table below in the results section is simply the squared correlation of the value of the dependent variable with the predicted values of the respective model. This measure can be more intuitively interpreted for intermediate values compared to log-likelihood ratio indices.
Results
Table 2 presents the regression results obtained for the three time periods we consider and the two variants of the gatekeeper index. In all cases the dependent variable is the number of patent applications of the agents (private firms, public institutions or individual innovators) during the indicated time periods. Focusing first on the long-run regression we observe persistence in innovative success only for the second regression. This becomes evident for the coefficient associated with the lagged number of patent applications (here during the period 1995 to 1997) which is statistically significant with a quite large value of the t-statistic. Agents that were successful innovators in the past are very likely to be so in the future. A possible explanation for the mixed results might be due to the architecture of the dataset, which is based on requiring a positive number of patent applications in t 2 1.
Significantly positive is the number of inventors involved in generating the inventions and therefore in the patenting process. We interpret this result as the effect of the variety of different experiences that inventors are able to contribute in the research process. This interpretation is also related to the notion of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) since more inventors involved generate a greater variety of ideas out of a larger range of different experiences accumulated in the course of their past research endeavors.
Turning to the variables related to our research questions, the next variable is concerned with the degree of an innovator in his/her respective network. This variable is significant throughout and reveals that a larger number of different research partners leading to a greater variety of relations in the network promotes innovative success.
The effect of the intensity of a gatekeeper position on innovative success is investigated with a quadratic specification. One central result is that being in a gatekeeper position is not unequivocally beneficial for innovative success. The negative linear term and the significantly positive coefficient for the quadratic term together imply a U-shaped relation between the gatekeeper position and innovative success. Only innovators with a gatekeeper index above a certain threshold are able to reap the benefits from their gatekeeper position. In the case of the first regression this threshold is at a gatekeeper index of about 43, implying that beyond this value innovative success increases whereas gatekeepers with an index value below 43 may generate benefits for their regional innovation system as a whole but are not able to benefit individually from their position. These interpretations hold irrespective of the gatekeeper index variant used, just the threshold level increases slightly to about 45 for Gatekeeper2.
High betweenness centrality always has a significantly negative effect on these regressions. This appears to be puzzling and is difficult to reconcile with theoretical considerations. In the case of the dummy variable indicating membership in the main component (the largest connected part) of the network we observe no significant effect. Membership in the main component is, however, in no case detrimental to innovative success as indicated by the positive sign of the respective coefficients.
Turning to the other variables, we find the dummy variable for innovators hosted in the former eastern part of Germany to be significantly negative. The dummy variable for public institutions is associated with a significantly positive coefficient whereas the dummy variable for individual innovators acts significantly negative. Since the reference group against which From the ZIGP regression results we can infer that overdispersion is indeed present (the corresponding parameter is significantly positive) and that there also is some indication of zero-inflation, albeit statistically significant only in one case, namely the regression for the second variant of the gatekeeper index.
When we compare these findings with the short-run results (subperiods with t 2 1 ¼ P1; t ¼ P2 and t 2 1 ¼ P2; t ¼ P3) we observe similarities to the long-run results as well as differences. Turning first to the similarities of the short-and long-run results we find positive effects of the degree centrality which are statistically significant throughout. The same applies to the betweenness, although here with a negative sign. A second notable point concerns the results for the two gatekeeper indices. We observe a negative coefficient estimate in the case of the linear term and a positive coefficient estimate in the case of the quadratic term. This is robust across all time periods considered as well as for both variants of the gatekeeper index. Thus, the sign pattern establishes the U-shaped form of the effect. The linear term appears to be less significant than the quadratic term. Most important for our interpretation of the influence of this variable is the quadratic term which is significantly positive in the majority of cases. It is also evident that the effect of the gatekeeper index is more pronounced in the long run, which is quite intuitive since it takes time to establish such a position in a network and it is also to be expected that the benefits are more likely to show up in the long run rather than in the short run. Finally, goodness-offit is roughly the same in both subperiods and is comparable in magnitude to the long-run regressions.
Considering the differences, we point to four notable changes when looking at the short-run regressions. First, irrespective of the variant of the gatekeeper index used, the innovation persistence parameter is significantly positive in the first subperiod and significantly negative in the second subperiod. The insignificant coefficient estimate in the long-run results seems to reflect a mix of the differential developments in the subperiods. The counterintuitive result of a negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable might also be explained by sample construction. Actors that only rarely patent are included in the sample only if they patent in t 2 1 irrespective of whether they patent during t. The reverse case of not patenting in t 2 1 but patenting in t is impossible since we include only those actors for which we are able to compute the network measures. Second, it appears that the effect of the number of inventors is mainly driven by the first subperiod. Third, the effect of being a member of the main component is stronger in the subperiods, especially in the second subperiod. Fourth, while the effects of the dummy variables for the east, public firms and individual inventors have the same sign in all regressions, they are substantially smaller in magnitude in the case of the short-run regressions compared to our previous findings for the long run. Correspondingly, the long run findings for the dummies are significant throughout, whereas significance is lost for some cases in the short-run regressions.
Conclusions
We have investigated the impact of actors' positions within four regional innovator networks on their innovative performance. Concerning the influence of a central network position on innovation output we have found clear evidence for the positive role of the number of linkages on innovation. A larger number of linkages can be associated with a greater diversity of the knowledge bases which opens up opportunities for further advancements of knowledge. The positive effect of being in the main component of the respective network not only shows that direct relations determine the accessible knowledge pool but also that indirect contacts play an important role. However, we do not observe a positive effect of a central position as measured by the betweenness centrality. On the contrary, we are faced with the puzzling result of a significant negative effect of this measure.
Motivated by the literature on regional innovation systems we have pursued a further refinement of the analysis. Bathelt et al. (2004) suggest that a blend of local and external relations is beneficial for the development of the entire innovation system; therefore, we have distinguished relations according to the location of partners. This leads to our main research question which is concerned with the influence of gatekeepers on innovative performance. On the individual level we find that being a gatekeeper-characterised by multiple internal and external contacts-matters for innovative success. Our results suggest a U-shaped relation between the intensity of a gatekeeper position and innovation performance. Accordingly, it might be better not to be a gatekeeper at all than just to have few internal and external relations. It also implies that being in a salient gatekeeper position is particularly attractive. This reflects a trade-off between two opposing effects: on the one hand, gatekeepers have privileged access to valuable external knowledge while, on the other hand, this knowledge leaks out in the process of diffusion which counteracts the exclusive usage of that knowledge. In that sense, our findings suggest that gatekeepers provide a (local) public or club good to the innovation system as they are not able to reap all the benefits accruing from their brokering position. To provide a more refined answer to the question of who benefits from these relations, we would have to test whether connections to gatekeepers influence innovative performance. Provided that knowledge flows only occur between connected agents, our hypothesis would be that externally acquired knowledge is a club good shared among the members of the network rather than a public good. This finding is consistent with the observation of Graf (2010) that public research fulfills its function to collect and disseminate external knowledge.
with the local address of the subsidiary or research facility. If none of the inventors could be traced to a local organisation, but the external innovator has a local subsidiary which could be related with the invention's content, the patent is likewise associated with the address of the local subsidiary.
If only one of the inventors is not based in the region, the patent remains precautionary with the original innovator's address. An exception to this rule was made when it was known that the external innovator holds the patents only for administrative purposes. In this special case, the patent is assigned to a local subsidiary or research facility if at least one inventor was identified as an employee of this local institution. If no inventor could be traced to a local subsidiary or research facility of the assignee, it was checked if the external inventors could be associated with any external institutions. If inventors belonged to other external subsidiaries of the assignee the patent was ascribed to that institution.
